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FREEDOM AND GROWTH. THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE? 
Here the sweet odor of freedom greets me, that is, of the greatest 
constitutional limitation. 
[Goethe in Augsburg, 1790 (Boyle 1992: 651)] 
Economic history and freedom 
This paper discusses the assumption, common to layman and economic historian alike, 
that political freedoms -- most notably the natural liberties established by the 
seventeenth-century civil wars in England -- were essential in ensuring Europe's 
breakthrough to the industrial world: in other words, in accomplishing the European 
miracle, as a distinguished former member of this School has dubbed it (Gellner 1988, 
echoing Jones 1981). This assumption I will dispute. I shall argue that most economic 
historians use the concept of freedom in a loose and misleading way, which hides 
more than it reveals. I shall, further, attempt to demonstrate that the connection 
between past political liberties and high rates of growth is unproven, and indeed that 
civic liberties may on occasion have been a cause of economic decline. I shall 
conclude by suggesting a different avenue of enquiry for understanding how political 
regimes may have affected growth in the past -- and are possibly doing so in the 
present also. 
Before proceeding any further, however, we must briefly discuss how economic 
historians define freedom and how they apply the concept to their work. Most 
economic historians subscribe to the economists' normative definition of freedom as 
the ability of an individual to maximise her utility in the absence of constraints; it is 
a libertarian view that draws comfort from the claim, commonly ascribed to Adam 
Smith, that such a condition provides the most effective means of promoting both 
individual and general welfare. On closer scrutiny we see that the definition actually 
combines two distinct concepts of freedom: a broad and negative notion, which bears 
considerable social and institutional implications, of freedom from constraint, and a 
narrower and positive notion which refers to the ability to choose in the market. 
Historians concerned with economic growth tend, perhaps understandably, to be more 
interested in the former than the latter, more in questions of institutional change than 
in the nature of and the conditions for economic choice. What follows discusses some 
recent arguments which trace an explicit line of causation from forms of 
institutionalized freedom to economic growth in the past. The point of departure is the 
view that growth before the Industrial Revolution was primarily Smithian; that is, it 
was based on increasing division of labour (specialization) both within and between 
individual tasks and, more especially, within and between regions (e.g. Persson 1988). 
Since specialization is a function of the extent of the market, which in turn is defined 
mainly by the technical and institutional limits to trade, I what we might call neo-
Smithian historians have paid particular attention to the historical barriers to the 
efficient allocation of resources and the free flow of goods. 
In so far as market imperfections cause unequal access to economic resources, this 
approach brings the issue of freedom firmly onto centre stage. For if we accept that 
access to resources is sanctioned and reproduced by social norms and rules (property 
rights and rights of entitlement) that are defined and are thus potentially contestable 
in the political, rather than the purely economic realm, it follows (as the founders of 
the discipline, Hume, Smith, and Marx, were well aware of) that economic growth 
will be influenced to a considerable degree by the politically sanctioned distribution 
of political freedom -- and hence of power -- within societies. 
It thus seems that the exercise of economic freedom is inextricably linked to the 
exercise of power. And yet, within the negative definition of freedom most often 
subscribed to by economic historians (that is, freedom from constraint), power and 
freedom stand opposed. For if we take the common definition of economic power as 
a person' s ability to further her interests by imposing (or credibly threatening to 
I Market size is a function also of individual demand and population size within 
a given territory, which however in pre-industrial societies tend to undergo change 
more slowly. 
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impose) sanctions on another person where the converse is not true,l it follows that 
freedom in the economic historian's sense is defined as the absence of such sanctions. 
In this sense, the relationship between power and freedom emerges as a zero-sum 
game: one can gain only as much freedom as someone else must lose power, and vice 
versa. 
In actual fact the relation between freedom and power is far more ambivalent. On the 
one hand, while being free means to have the ability to achieve a desired goal, this 
ability in turn implies the active exercise of control. On the other hand, freedom can 
be defined only in relation to unfreedom; to be free there must be a condition one 
wishes to escape from. In both cases, freedom is based on an asymmetrical relation: 
freedom was born as a privilege and has remained so ever since (Bauman 1988: 9). 
Simply put, rather than following naturally from someone else's lack of power, a 
condition of freedom always implies the agent's exercise of power.3 In other words, 
the negative definition of freedom as the matter of what we are at liberty to do also 
implies a positive meaning of freedom as the matter of what we are able to do. 
The purely negative definition of freedom we have just examined is partly the result 
of the economist's ingrained suspicion of arguments that appeal to normative concepts 
like power to explain the economic institutions of the past.4 Nonetheless, most 
1 A related voluntarist definition focuses on an agent's ability to affect the 
incentives facing another agent so that it is rational for the latter to do something 
she would not otherwise have chosen to do. 
3 This claim differs slightly from, but does not contradict, the more common 
statement that an agent's freedom involves exercising control over what happens to 
her. 
4 The suspicion is connected with the analytical distinction, established by the 
neo-classical agenda during the late nineteenth century, between the allocative and 
the redistributive functions of markets, i.e. between efficiency and equity -- neo-
classical economics being concerned only with the former (de Marchi & Morgan, 
forthcoming: Introduction) . 
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economists also have a strong ideological commitment to the view, purportedly 
bolstered by Adam Smith's attack on ancien regime and mercantilist restrictions, that 
the absence of political coercion is of essence for ensuring economic growth.' This 
ambiguity with respect to the role of power in economic activities is the source of a 
curious paradox. 
Following the principles of positive economics, hard-nosed historians have exercised 
considerable ingenuity and vast resources to demonstrate that -the most extreme 
examples of past unfreedom, slavery, serfdom and debt bondage, were economically 
rational and efficient (pogel & Engermann 1974, Fenoaltea 1975, Engerrnann 1992). 
Most of us will find this conclusion disturbing, for at least two reasons. On the one 
hand, it implies that societies based on unfree labour would have been no better off 
had everyone been free. On the other hand, it seems to be unconcerned with freedom 
in the positive sense of a capacity or power to choose between different courses of 
action, of which human bondage is the most extreme denial . Our bemusement 
increases, however, when we are assured practically in the same breath that economic 
backwardness in the past was due largely to autocratic, absolutist lords who could 
exercise predatory rule over their lands -- on the converse assumption that the 
presence of negative freedom from constraint would have made everyone better off 
than they actually were. A by no means unique example of this tension can be found 
in a recent ambitious interpretation of the pre-industrial European economy (North & 
Thomas 1973). Here we find chapter 3, which depicts medieval serfdom as a freely 
established contract between lord and peasant in which protection is exchanged for 
bonded labour, followed at a suitable distance by chapter 10, which explains early 
modem Spanish and French economic retardation as the result of oppressive, and 
hence economically inefficient, political structures. 
, This view is based on a misguided projection of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century definitions of political freedom as universal suffrage and participatory 
democracy onto Smith's quite different political categories. (see Winch 1978: 83--
6) 
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The first kind of argument is clearly a dead end for our purposes, since it tells us little 
about the connection between freedom and economic growth, and indeed seems 
actually to deny that any such connection exists. Rather more promising is the opposite 
claim, customary to theories of modernization, that the presence or the development 
of political freedoms was a necessary condition for more rapid pre-industrial growth. 6 
The European miracle 
In this context, the main line of thought brings under the same roof economic 
historians (e.g. North & Thomas 1973) and historical sociologists (e.g. Hall 1985, 
Mann 1989) concerned with explaining the rise of the West. By the European miracle, 
as we saw, is meant the breakthrough to capitalist industrialism in late eighteenth-
century England, followed over the next few decades by the countries of continental 
Europe. Although the basic concept is hardly watertight - a miracle, by definition, 
cannot be explained, and the assumption that an industrial breakthrough could have 
occurred only in western Europe is dubious to say the least (Jones 1988) -- explicit 
speculation about the links between Western institutional freedoms and European 
growth are unusual, and it is therefore worthwhile discussing them at some length. 
North and Weingast (1989) have argued that the changes in the structure of political 
representation that followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688--89 had remarkable 
consequences for the eighteenth-century English economy. The story is a familiar one. 
The increasing tax needs of the Stuart sovereigns in the early seventeenth century 
could no longer be funded with traditional revenue from crown lands. Sale of these 
lands did not make up the shortfall, and the Stuarts were forced to find new sources 
6 I follow economic historians' usual practice in confining myself to 
development in the narrow sense of an increase in per capita income. Were one to 
take a broader view of development that incorporates general measures of well-
being such as basic civic and political freedoms, a democracy would virtually by 
definition be more conducive to development than a non-democratic regime. Such 
democratic freedoms are not, however, immediately apparent in the pre-industrial 
societies we are concerned with here, and so the issue can be safely ignored. 
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of income. This set them against Parliament, which had the established right to grant 
new taxes, typically for extraordinary purposes such as war but also in the fonn of 
excise on trade. Faced with Parliamentary resistance, James I and especially Charles 
I imposed new taxes without the Commons' consent. They also resorted increasingly 
to forced loans (which were repaid, if ever, with considerable delay), to the sale of 
monopoly rights and of patents of nobility, to purveyance (the requisitioning of goods 
at below market prices), and to other more or less hidden fonns of taxation. The more 
the landed and commercial interests represented in Parliament demanded conditions 
and limits to the Crown's authority in exchange for financial support, the more the 
Crown was forced by insolvency to resort to underhand expropriation. 
The Stuart monarchy could act in this way because it combined executive, legislative 
and judicial powers and possessed a comparative advantage in coercion. Parliament' s 
capacity to enforce institutional checks on royal power was restricted; consequently, 
the Crown could renege more or less unilaterally on prior agreements and modify the 
existing structure of property rights. The result was to promote a coalition of subjects 
seeking to preserve personal liberties, rights, and wealth; the Civil War ensued. None 
the less, the constitutional balance shifted decisively in support of secure property 
rights only with the Declaration of Rights of 1689, which enshrined Parliamentary 
sovereignty. Parliament re-established authority over the right to tax, gained the right 
to audit government accounts, curtailed royal prerogative powers, and established the 
independence of the law. These political rights laid the foundations on which economic 
rights were erected. 
North and Weingast measure the subsequent gains in economic freedom through 
changes in government finances and capital markets. Even though government 
expenditure and government debt increased hugely after 1688 (by 1720 public debt 
stood at over 50 times the level in 1688), rates of interest fell and the trap of 
inflationary finance was avoided; private capital markets also expanded under the 
wings of government finance, with beneficial effects on the wider economy. Greater 
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financial efficiency was the result of the Glorious Revolution's enforcement of 
economic freedom in the shape of secure property rights. By making it impossible for 
the Crown to change the rules of economic activity ad libitum, Parliament also made 
the government's behaviour more predictable, and lenders were consequently 
forthcoming. 
Examined more carefully, in fact, the latter argument is simply suggesting that secure 
property rights are a critical condition for growth. Secure property rights are not a 
critical measure of freedom, however, not even in the sense of equality before the law 
subscribed to by North and Weingast (Munzer 1990: ch. 7, Ryan 1987: ch.7). The 
latter's confusion arises from their conflation ofjreedom with the security of property 
rights engendered by a government's precommitment to constitutional rules: 
For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not 
merely establish the relevant set of rights, but make a credible 
commitment to them. (North & Weingast 1989: 803) 
I return to this point further below. For the moment let us simply note that although 
an autocratic government (that is, one not subjected to constitutional checks and 
constraints) will be unable to provide the necessary commitment to existing property 
rights, and will therefore tend more or less deliberately to stifle opportunities for 
growth, it by no means follows that free (in the sense of Liberal democratic)7 
institutions will produce an efficient or indeed superior degree of commitment. In fact, 
as we shall see, it is far from obvious that democratic freedoms will be associated 
either with secure property rights or with a credible precommitment to constitutional 
rules. Democratic freedoms do not by themselves provide the appropriate conditions 
for fostering economic growth . 
7 I follow this middle-of-the-road Liberal definition of democracy so as to 
avoid the complications that arise if one argues, as another former member of the 
School Friedrich von Hayek did, that a democracy may be illiberal and a dictator 
liberal (where liberalism is defined as a system of individual freedom under the 
rule of law with wide scope for free-market activity). (Arneson 1993 : 145-6) 
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European cities and freedom 
The conviction none the less that the emergence of political and civil liberties was 
inextricably linked to economic freedom (North & Weingast 1989: 829)8 also 
underlies the long-standing view that western Europe's successful path of growth owes 
much to the existence of independent cities (see Smith 1976: rn, iii--iv). This 
proposition comes under two intertwined but separable forms. First, it is suggested 
that the economic and social changes linked to European modernization, that is, with 
the transition from a traditionalist, corporatist, religiously-minded society, to the 
increasingly secularised, individualistic and mobile world of capitalism, originated and 
developed in towns (Langton & Hoppe 1983, Hicks 1969). The growing material 
wealth, new codes of law, religious beliefs and aesthetics, nation states and, 
ultimately, world domination associated with western European modernization can all 
be traced back to the peculiar dynamism of its urban society, and to the social tensions 
and innovations that this engendered. Secondly, it is argued that European sovereigns 
were forced to meet their fiscal requirements by allying with the towns against the 
feudal aristocracy in exchange for financial support; in turn, bargaining over taxes led 
to forms of parliamentary representation and thus, over time, to modern parliamentary 
democracy. 
In the first view, western European cities derive their unique historical role from being 
both the main and at times the only fora of exchange, and the main and at times the 
only centres of cultural, economic and institutional innovation. Within this brief, Max 
Weber is often credited with the opinion that the medieval Western city is the source 
of modern legal and political freedoms (Weber 1978: vol. 2, 1212--372, Kiisler 1988: 
8 The lines of causation implied in the quotation and discussed in this essay run 
from political freedom to economic development. The opposite argument, that 
economic growth promotes political freedom , has been restated forcefully by 01son 
1991; it is criticized by Huber, Rueschmeyer & Stephens 1993 . 
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42--8, 200, Berrnan 1983: ch. 12). 9 But, as Weber pointed out, the origin of those 
freedoms lay in an act of usurpation of legitimate (feudal) power by groups of burgers 
who acted collectively to establish their free status -- that is, subject to a special and 
autonomous law (Weber 1978: vol. 2, 1254). The emergence of free citizen status, 
therefore, also defined non-citizens as unfree; urban freedom (similarly to North and 
Weingast's property rights) was the outcome of a juridically sanctioned privilege 
which distinguished the town from the feudal or subject countryside. Thus it hardly 
comes as a surprise that during much of the Middle Ages and the early modem 
period, ' freedom' was actually used in the sense of 'privilege' (Bridbury 1986) . 
This first line of argument therefore depicts town-country relations as a stark contrast 
between urban modernity and freedom and rural conservatism. Over the last twenty 
years, however, the evidence for these claims has come under strong and convincing 
attack. Research on pre-industrial rural manufactures (or proto-industry, as it is often 
called) shows not only that they had an often greater economic impact than had 
contemporary urban industries, but that a critical prerequisite for proto-industrial 
success was a lack of competing urban freedoms: an absence, that is, of those 
privileges that enabled a town to gain monopoly rents from its hinterland and ban any 
rural activities that threatened its own industries (Ogilvie 1993). Here, then, the 
ambivalent nature of political freedom raises a dilemma for those wishing to link such 
freedom to economic growth: urban privileges, which had been necessary to establish 
the towns' autonomy from feudal authority in the first place, later turned into fetters 
on growth and on the economic liberties of the rural population. The dilemma, of 
course, is the result of the asymmetrical relation between freedom and unfreedom that 
we discussed at the outset. 
9 Weber is actually rather ambiguous on this subject. (Weber 1978: vol. 2, 
1323) 
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A similar tension underlies our second model linking urban economic and political 
freedom, which centres on relations between cities and the state. This approach, 
although also owing something to Weberian analyses, emphasizes the capacity of pre-
industrial European cities to avoid the stifling embrace of the tax-hungry state: the 
dichotomy in this case being one between urban capital and state coercion. (filly 
1990) 
The relation between urban economic growth and political representation in late 
medieval and early modem Europe is discussed by Blockmans (1989), who postulates 
an inherent hostility between feudal and royal authority on the one hand and cities on 
the other. Monarchs regularly strived for total control of a territory from their 
administrative center, whereas cities were concerned with commercial profits and 
therefore preferred open routes of travel and communication along coasts and rivers 
to politically enforced borders. (Blockmans 1989: 733,735) 
The main impetus to increased political coercion came from rising military competition 
between European states. The early modern military revolution had to be paid for by 
vastly increased rates of taxation. Being both wealthier and more easily assessed than 
the countryside, towns tended to bear the brunt of states' financial requirements. 
However, military expenditure and bureaucratic controls were antithetical to early 
commercial capitalism; therefore, where fiscal pressure could be exerted more or less 
unrestrained, commercial and financial metropoles were stifled. This explains why the 
core cities of the European economy were always fairly independent from overarching 
monarchies (Blockmans 1989: 752; see also Tilly 1990: 52--3); growth could occur 
only in towns or regions where state control was weak or non-existent, such as late 
medieval Barcelona, Prague, Augsburg, Nurnberg, Antwerp, Danzig and Flanders. 
Urban commercial capital and state coercion are thus portrayed as antithetical. 
Political representation, however, saw monarchs and cities on the same side. The 
former required an ally to establish full sovereignty over the feudal aristocracy; in 
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exchange for the towns' support, rulers vested them with vast political and economic 
privileges that transfonned the urban elites into rentiers (Bloclcmans 1989: 752). This 
occurred in France, in the Crown of Aragon, in the southern Netherlands and in 
Piedmont. Towns free of a superior lord and left to their own devices, by contrast, 
eschewed representative institutions. Instead, either one metropolis established control 
over its region, as did Florence, Milan or Venice in central and northern Italy, or a 
loose federation of towns such as the North Sea Ranse emerged in its place. In the 
first case, the dominant city's elites were rapidly corrupted by their new-found 
powers, which they deployed to exploit their subject territories (Epstein 1993); in the 
second case, the federated cities suffered from a lack of organization and fell prey to 
more powerful territorial rulers. 
Underlying this analysis is a paradox which seems to subvert any causal link between 
urban political and economic freedom. That is, just as economic freedom appears 
incapable of sustaining political freedom (in the shape of urban territorial 
independence), political freedom (in the shape of urban parliamentary representation) 
seems incapable of sustaining economic freedom . The rationale of this apparently 
pessimistic conclusion becomes clearer when we examine an example of city-state 
relations in greater detail. 
The early modem Netherlands possessed both the most developed and urbanized 
European economy of their time and a precociously democratic government, a 
republican federation of 58 independent cities all having equal voting rights . They 
therefore seem to provide a good example for the claim that urban political freedom 
brought about economic success . Not so, argues Marjolene 't Hart (1989) . When the 
Dutch constitutional settlement was developed in the late 1570s, no individual city had 
as yet established superiority over the others. This lack of clear leadership was 
compounded by the rule that required the 58 cities' unanimity on all issues of national 
interest such as war, peace and taxation . Decision-making was thus a particularly 
complex and fraught process, prey to constantly shifting coalitions and to debilitating 
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bargaining processes. Up to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the all-out war of 
independence against the Spanish Empire provided the cities with a common external 
focus and helped them to paper over their differences. But the end of the conflict made 
compromise increasingly hard to achieve, and local particularism tended to prevail. 
The dispersal of political authority among a large number of competing commercial 
and industrial centres restricted the late seventeenth-century Dutch state's capacity to 
make bold and timely decisions, particularly in matters concerning the country's 
commercial and political interests in the international arena. The need for unanimity 
made it harder to change and adapt to new international balances of power, which in 
turn became an important cause of Dutch decline in the eighteenth century ('t Hart 
1989: 681) . In conclusion, although economic success achieved political freedom (by 
enabling the Dutch to finance an 80-year war of independence against the world's 
most powerful empire), the opposite seems not to have held true: in the longer run, 
political freedom may have been achieved at the cost of relative economic decline. As 
with the relations between town and country discussed above, we see how the political 
preconditions of urban economic success were later transformed into institutional 
fetters to further growth. 
Freedom and growth 
We appear to have come full circle. Having begun with the hypothesis that political 
freedom was essential for economic success, we are being led to conclude that the two 
may be incompatible. The modem version of this argument -- popular with lacobins 
both Right and Left -- that democratic freedoms pose a threat to growth is based on 
two claims (przeworski & Limongi 1993). Firstly, democracies fall prey to pressure 
groups, whose elected representatives pursue the particularistic goals of their 
constituencies rather than collective or national interests; this tends to favour policies 
aiming at economic redistribution rather than generalized growth (Olson 1982, Becker 
1983) . And secondly, democracies can overturn past laws and decisions, so long as 
a qualified majority decides so and there exist no constitutional constraints on such 
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change (Elster & Slagstad 1988); this causes uncertainty and inhibits strategic planning 
and investment. The tyranny of particularism and the lack of precommitment 
therefore make it of the essence to insulate the state's decision-making processes in 
order to pursue effective policies for economic growth. Democratic inefficiencies 
mean that authoritarian rule is necessary to ensure long-term run growth. 
The reader will recall that North and Weingast's analysis of the economic implications 
of English Parliamentary freedoms was criticized along similar lines . I pointed out that 
the authors confused the normative and political issue of freedom from autocratic 
government with the positive and economic issue of precommitment to rules, and I 
suggested that their assumption that democratic rule produces a higher degree of 
precommitment to rules than autocracy was unwarranted. The reasons for this 
scepticism are now clear: the need for precommitment is undermined by a 
democracy's ability to renege on past decisions and by its submission to the whims of 
particular interests. 
Before concluding that economic growth and political freedoms are antithetical, 
however, let us return once more to North and Weingast's argument. At a closer 
reading, they imply a far greater degree of uncertainty than we might expect. In 
particular, they suggest that eighteenth century absolutist France may have been 
growing as fast as parliamentary England, thereby throwing into disarray their claim 
that institutional changes gave England a decisive economic edge over its European 
rivals, since the French regime was, of course, untouched by parliamentary reform 
before the Revolution. 
The authors try to neutralize this potentially devastating admission (North & Weingast 
1989: 830) by suggesting that England's general economic success is demonstrated by 
its overwhelming military achievements during the eighteenth century, in particular 
against France: with the advantage of hindsight, we know that France was living on 
borrowed time. It is a bold sleight of hand based on the even bolder claim, that 
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military success is proof of economic prowess. The claim is hardly borne out by the 
facts, however: as early modem Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia demonstrated to 
great effect, one could be an outstandingly successful military state even while 
overseeing an impoverished and underdeveloped society. 
This discrepancy between power and resources is actually rather easily explained: pre-
industrial success on the battlefield depended not on potentially available wealth, but 
on a state's ability to extract revenue efficiently from whatever its economy could 
offer (Brewer 1988: 336). Military effectiveness depended on administrative 
efficiency, not on a country's absolute level of wealth. This point has wide-ranging 
implications. For it has recently been argued that the most significant effects of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688--89 lay precisely in the administrative changes which the 
event initiated, and which enhanced the English state's capacity to wage war: a period 
more famous for its praise of liberty actually witnessed the creation of the fiscal-
military state (Brewer 1990: xi, xvii) . Levels of taxation rose as high or higher than 
in the rest of Europe, and state debt reached unheard of proportions . Such changes 
became possible largely thanks to the reforms discussed by North and Weingast, which 
made government more publicly accountable and enhanced its political legitimacy. The 
changes also underlay a shift in England's international status, from the relatively 
marginal position it had held under the Tudors and Stuarts to its central role on the 
European and world stages after 1700. The change was financed by taxation and 
sustained by war. 
Although the incidence of English taxation resembled that of many other European 
states, the English system of exaction had a number of distinctive features . First, tax 
collection was more centralized than in rival states, and was based on larger numbers 
of centrally appointed and professionally trained government officials. Secondly, 
England's lack of internal jurisdictional and revenue boundaries made it easier to 
police and repress tax evasion compared to most continental countries, where 
jurisdictional fragmentation and administrative heterogeneity made revenue policing 
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an administrative nightmare (Brewer 1988: 372). Thirdly, the English tax system 
applied uniformly throughout the country, again in striking contrast with rivals such 
as France and the Dutch Republic, where innumerable regional, group and individual 
privileges and immunities compounded the difficulty described above of ensuring fiscal 
compliance. Lastly, the openness of the English tax system to public scrutiny created 
a degree of public confidence that was lacking in other, more secretive countries, and 
conversely made it very difficult to voice opposition to taxes once Parliament had 
granted its consent. In sum, despite the English monarchy'S constitutional constraints, 
the English tax system was both more efficient and less subject to evasion or 
resistance than under nominally more powerful, absolutist continental regimes. 
This apparently paradoxical conclusion corresponds to recent re-evaluations of the 
character of ancien regime Europe, in particular of French absolutism. The currently 
accepted view of French absolute monarchy contrasts strikingly with the picture of a 
despotic and tyrannical regime outlined by North and others (North & Thomas 1973: 
chs. 8, 10, North & Weingast 1989, Macfarlane 1987, Olson 1991). If indeed one had 
to sum up the regime's failings in a single word , it would be: ineffectiveness. The 
main constraint on royal authority has already been mentioned: the towering pyramid 
of inherited and newly established powers and jurisdictions, which gave local and 
regional societies vast margins of political manoeuvre and, indeed, independence in 
their dealings with the crown. Within a society for which legal propriety was 
sacrosanct, the ruler could not, by law (and there were many different kinds of law 
with overlapping jurisdictions), encroach upon the privileges and rights -- the liberties, 
as they were rightly called -- of the provincial elites, the town councils, and the 
myriad other corporate bodies which made up the French body politic. Both in abstract 
theory and in everyday practice, the ruler was supreme political mediator rather than 
autocrat. (Mettam 1990) 
This predicament had far-reaching consequences. The vast number of sectional 
interests endowed with juridically sanctioned liberties made it necessary to insulate the 
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French royal councils from outside pressure by surrounding them with a high degree 
of secrecy; this in turn tended to transform law-making and especially economic 
regulation into a discretionary prerogative of the bureaucracy (Root 1991). Political 
secrecy and bureaucratic discretionality, which made it easier to lobby for privileges 
outside the glare of public scrutiny, are of course the alleged hallmarks of 
authoritarian absolutism. Yet the state's ability to implement its decisions, including 
grants of privileges and benefices, faced severe and in some ways insuperable 
constraints. Local and regional representative institutions (parlements, estates, urban 
councils and suchlike) could challenge the legitimacy of royal jurisdiction; the 
country's administrative complexity made uniform enforcement difficult if not 
impossible to achieve; and implementation itself was usually in the hands of local 
bodies, which had every opportunity to stall, delay or even boycott any centrally 
legislated decision . 
In sum, despite the ostensibly greater authority of absolute monarchy, a French ruler 
was less powerful, that is, less able to put his will to good effect, than his English 
constitutional counterpart. Absolutist inefficiency was the result not of excessive and 
unchecked tyranny and of the lack of freedom, but of quite the opposite: of the surfeit 
of politically sanctioned liberties and of the difficulty in enforcing universally valid 
rules which those privileges entailed. By contrast, the English settlement of 1688-89 
could work as effectively as it did because it relied on a powerful and centralized 
representative institution. Although the relative openness and size of the English 
assembly made it harder to reach decisions than in more secretive systems such as the 
French one, decisions taken and laws passed by the English Parliament had far greater 
legitimacy and could be implemented far more consistently and effectively than in 
continental absolutist states. (Levi 1988: ch. 6) 
Thus, the main economic limit to absolutism seems to be one we saw imputed also to 
democracy: the excessive and debilitating hold of particular interests. Although the 
paradox should not be pushed too far (whereas Liberal democracy is based on 
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universal equality before the law, ancien regime liberties were premised on legal 
inequality), it suggests an interesting conclusion with respect to our theme, the 
connection between political freedom and economic performance. Although the view 
that politics matters for economic growth seems intuitively correct, the nature of the 
political regime does not appear to be the critical explanatory variable: the republican 
Dutch faced similar problems of implementation to the absolutist French, and any 
advantages the English might have had seem to have had little to do with civic liberties 
as we conceive of them today. What we should perhaps be reflecting on instead are 
the institutions which mediate between the structure of political regimes and their 
economies: the mechanisms whereby political decisions are reached, and the 
administrative systems and written and tacit rules (including perhaps such intangible 
forces as trust (Gambetta 1988) and civic mindedness (putnam 1993)) whereby such 
decisions are implemented. 
17 
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